Danièle Saint-Ville-Leplé - entry No.4 (Gregory)

Having a global, yet detailed and accurate vision of the battlefield is undoubtedly empowering. This 'macro-field of micro-visions' allows to adjust efficiently the means to the situation. Based on this accurate information the army intents establishing a 'pattern of life', constructing 'activity-based information', in order to identify the militants and minimize collateral casualties. Though the technical progress is undeniable, the way to process information remains subject to flaws. Derek Gregory even insists on the fact that assuming mere Rules of Engagement will solve the problem is missing the core of the issue.
Multiple human factors are still present as a source of possible errors. The drone war is in no way 'perfect' or unmanned, for there is a whole complex network of on-ground or off-ground people interconnected in the killing chain. And this network shows a culturally-constructed bias in the way it processes the information. Gregory uses here the concept of visuality to make his point. The visibilities are constructed culturally: on the battlefield, the otherness is perceived through subjective filters. This is why it is relevant to point out a correlated techno-cultural construction: constructed spaces of invisibility as a result of a partial process of the information.

Derek Gregory contends nonetheless the idea of anti-drones partisans: remote control does not turn bombers into inhuman, disengaged and irresponsible people.They are instead intensely immersed and feel a huge sense of responsibility toward their comrades on ground. This is essentially what makes them susceptibly more radical in their actions. The lives bombers aim at saving above all are their comrades' ones. The structure of the network - ultra-connected by the means of military social media - per se encourages flaws in the identification of the non-militant population. Military calculations tend to prevail on reasonings strictly respectful of International Law. International Law is taken in account only through the restrictive principle of proportionality of decisions.

Flaws in the identification of the militants should nonetheless be avoided. Killing civilians is highly counterproductive in a warfare attempting to fight insurgency movements, which main characteristics is precisely to mix with the population and obtain popular support in order to become imperceptible.The omnipresent 'fear of a faceless enemy' can only result in popular resentment.

Some internal remarks about Gregory's work may come to mind. The historical affiliation attempt is really interesting and should be pursued. However, the parallel between bombers and video gamers should not, in my view, be dismissed so promptly. This idea deserves being thought about more thoroughly. There are indeed testimonies accrediting a certain form of troubling sensation of almightiness (Gregory himself quotes a pilot: "Sometimes I felt like a God hurling thunderbolts from afar" (Martin 2010)). An raw hypothesis can also be made. That of a possible imperialistic view of the battlefield emerging on the part of the actors involved - as they put in place an unofficial warfare, supported by an interventionist ideology, and disdainful of the consent of the population.

More generally, through the reading of this article, some problems popped up that are still to be addressed. Further academic investigation on the consequences of real-time social networking during war appears as genuinely promising. Particular attention to the respective roles of the individual actor and of the community of actors would be beneficial. Another serious problem is that of the idea of a 'virtuous war'. Given even technical progress is not enough to guarantee a flawless warfare, is there any way for a war to ever be virtuous?