Course Description

The conventional story on war- and peacemaking almost always speaks of great deeds by Great Men. It tells how genius generals win wars and how skillful diplomats strike peace deals; how heroic soldiers fight and how selfless peacemakers unite; and, crucially, how wars end where peace begins and vice versa. Inspired by Tolstoy’s narrative of war as an assemblage of serendipity and chance, this course will look at war/peace beyond the lens of rationality and of strategic interests. Following Latour’s reading of Tolstoy, it will introduce a less anthropocentric and – hopefully - more pluralistic perspective by allowing other actors to make peace/war, such as UN reports and US drones, reconciliation workshops and surveillance techniques, etc. Building on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz, it will explore war as a general grid through which modern society can be analyzed even – and especially - during so-called peacetime.

Wednesday, April 2, 2014

bruno cuconato claro - entry no. 7 (on Khalili)

 Khalili's chapter in question is about an undesirable byproduct of the not-always-"smooth functioning of imperium." In her piece, Khalili does not analyse why countries engage in imperialistic tendencies, but rather how one aspect of empire manifests itself: the imprisonment of some of its subjects in order to maintain empire, and how proxies are employed to reduce costs of domination and to dissipate blame for or to hide violations. Hiding violations is specially important in a world were colonialism is supposedly extinguished, and where human rights violations are, if not eradicated, fought against actively by an international community of individuals and of nations – which for moral integrity supposition would not engage in such violations itself. Khalili's focus is in Israeli domination of Lebanon and of American war on terror, but her analysis can be extended to other situations.

"The early imperialists had it easier.", contemporary imperialists must think. Dominating in the past had its challenges, but it did not include juggling public opinion. Convincing oneself of the morality of the enterprise was easier too. Managing empire while keeping a good conscience involves shutting up voices, rendering revolts, violations and prisoners invisible, and downplaying leaks of information. Khalili shows us many of the instruments employed in this quest: "careful wording" of discourses and policy explanations, legal manipulation, and the use of proxies to do most of the dirty work. A shortcoming in Khalili's piece is that even if she succeeds at showing how empire employs proxies, she does not excel at showing how the relationship between proxies and empire can be tumultuous (perhaps it was Khalili's choice not to consider this for the piece.)

Khalili's piece is reminiscent of Taussig's piece in more than one instance. In one passage, Khalili writes: "any rational or economic calculation about detainees was simply subordinated to the intense desire for revenge against foreign fighters." She joins Taussig in his effort of dispelling the oversimplifications made by traditional historiography when considering imperialism. Just as Taussig does, Khalili considers imperialism as more than a relationship of domination; it is instead a seam of encounter." In this line where two or more cultures meet, hierarchies of gender and race are reinforced. Khalili considers this a deliberate reinforcement. I'm not that sure if that is true. It may be something intrinsic to the enmeshment of two cultures, not a foreseen objective.

Khalili's most important achievement, though, is her blurring of the line between sovereign states and the so-called terrorists. One official, she quotes, said that "[the law] is how we distinguish ourselves from the terrorists themselves. They act against the law, by violating and trampling it, while in its war against terrorism, a democratic state acts within the framework of the law and according to the law." But Khalili tells us that the law "is not the equitable distribution of justice, but the basis of the legitimization of power." Through the flexibility of the law, and the use of proxies, sovereign states can engage in immoral activities characteristic of terrorists. Or perhaps what characterizes terrorists is not their immorality, but as the official said, their lawlessness, and the states are just as immoral. (And if we consider that the state creates its own law, and that any social group has its own laws, even if they are not considered the legitimate-written Law, it becomes more difficult to differentiate between terrorists and sovereign states.) Or perhaps these states are not as democratic as they claim to be.


The quest for invisibility is a further indication of the moral dubiousness of the actions some states engage in. Even if courts are pursuing the truth, mechanisms of censorship and classification are in force to stop the truth from being found. Whistle-blowers are prosecuted, organizations that seek to make policy transparent are forbidden to exist, and their staff is also prosecuted. Governments, though, do all of this within the limits of the law. If law can not be trusted as good, what can?   

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